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Abstract 
 
In a single European aviation market (SEAM) that is open to innovative new business 
strategies, most notably the (ultra) low cost model developed by Ryanair, non-territorial 
forms of sovereignty have been used to redefine employment relations, exert contro l over 
labor, and extract surplus value. Although aviation unions recognize the need to ‘shift scale’ 
from a predominantly local focus on their national (flag) airline, they have yet to develop 
effective strategies at the supranational level as low fares airlines continually extend their 
geographical reach in the open skies over Europe and beyond. Union strategies are considered 
at different levels (national and EU) as well as the different processes to enact these strategies 
(technocratic and democratic). Unions need to develop a Euro-democratization strategy if 
they are to arrest the anti-unionism and social dumping of European ‘sky pirates’ such as 
Ryanair and Norwegian Air Shuttle.  
 
 
Keywords: low fares airlines, transnational trade unionism 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
1 
Introduction 
 
When the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 
recently hosted a public meeting in the European Parliament on the future of civil aviation, 
focusing on the competitive challenge and ever- increasing market share of low fares airlines 
(LFAs), the Group designated carriers such as Ryanair as ‘sky pirates’.1 The definition of a 
pirate, however, is one who steals at sea or plunders the land from the sea without commission 
from a sovereign state. This means that Michael O’Leary, Ryanair’s CEO, is better likened to 
Sir Francis Drake than Captain Jack Sparrow, because Ryanair’s aircraft are licensed in 
Ireland and all crew are employed on Irish contracts, including non-Irish nationals who are 
hired via an agency and work at one of the company’s sixty plus bases outside the Republic of 
Ireland, who fly to other European countries and never set foot on Irish soil. Thus, while 
‘modern-day piracy’ in the skies over Europe clearly involves a reconfiguration of sovereign 
authority in defiance of physical geography, it also depends on the commission of a sovereign 
state. Such commission enables LFAs, like their counterparts on the high seas (flag of 
convenience shipping),2 to adopt and adapt non-territorial sovereignty as a way of redefining 
employment relations, exerting control over labor, and extracting surplus value. 
 The low fares model was pioneered in the US domestic market during the 1970s by 
Southwest Airlines (SWA) and then copied, to a greater or lesser extent, by many other 
airlines. In Europe, the creation of a single European aviation market (SEAM) in the late 
1980s and 1990s not only opened the market to LFAs but also signaled a shift in regulatory 
authority from the nation state to the supranational institutions of the European Union (EU). 
However, this shift was not complete, neither in terms of aviation policy nor, in particular, 
social policy. As a result, wherever there are unclear delineations of national sovereignty, 
capital can develop new ‘spatial-juridical fixes’3 to sustain seemingly illegitimate practices 
(e.g. ‘piracy’) through a combination of ‘organizational liminality’ (the creative exploitation 
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of institutional and anti- institutional elements) 4  and ‘institutional deflection’ (deploying 
internal resources to neutralize threats in the external environment).5  
During the mid- to late-1990s when brash new entrants such as Ryanair and easyJet 
occupied a niche on the margins of the SEAM, LFAs attracted only passing attention from 
established (legacy) airlines and organized labor, but they are now dominant players in the 
market with well over 40 per cent of all intra-EU passenger traffic, with Ryanair now 
classified as Europe’s largest airline on this basis. In this rapidly changing context, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that trade unions are struggling to create their own ‘spatial fix’ in 
response to the new non-territorial spaces and management systems developed by LFAs, 
wedded as they are to the nation state and in the case of civil aviation to their national (flag) 
airline.6 Indeed, the historical roots of aviation unionism are predominantly ‘company-based’, 
such that even aviation unions that are now incorporated into multi-modal transport unions, or 
multi-sector general unions, still retain a close relationship with the nation’s legacy airline(s).  
The continued dependence of airline unions on legacy airlines has led to political 
support for what Erne7 denotes as ‘democratic renationalization’ (i.e. a reaffirmation of the 
autonomy of the nation state, not only with respect to aviation policy but also employment 
law and broader social protection) and practical support for ‘technocratic renationalization’ 
(i.e. national competitive strategies at the macro level and industrial restructuring and new 
business strategies at the micro level). This is not to suggest unquestioning support for the 
restructuring of national (flag) airlines, a process that has been accompanied by strikes and 
other forms of labor unrest across the EU, rather to highlight the imperatives of ‘regime 
competition’ 8  and the absence of any effective trade union response, to date, at the 
supranational level. 
 Regime competition originates in national institutional arrangements that are now 
located in and constrained by international competitive markets extending well beyond their 
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territorial reach.9 Firms located in less flexible and/or more costly institutional arrangements 
will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage and look for ways to maintain profitability, 
including new spatial-juridical fixes that exploit cracks in the inter-state system. 10  The 
ineffectiveness of trade union responses to the SEAM and new transnational business 
strategies, most notably those pioneered by LFAs, originates in the ‘national flag’ (airline) 
orientation of aviation unions. Moreover, the technocratic origins of the European Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ETF) and its ‘European technocratic strategy’ (i.e. leadership 
interaction with EU decision-makers) 11  has distanced aviation unions from their members 
and, at times, from each other. When unions’ engagement with the EU abdicates contentious 
politics in favor of industrial legality, then a ‘Euro-democratization strategy’ (i.e. the 
mobilization of aviation workers across all work spaces, contexts and job categories, their 
engagement in EU decision-making and their contribution to a European public sphere)12 
becomes all the more difficult.13 Nonetheless, there is a growing recognition amongst union 
officials and aviation workers that the route to protecting and improving their terms and 
conditions of employment is no longer local (company-based) or even national, but via 
European or possibly global action. 
 If the driving force that link s workers across Europe ‘is not the existence of a 
European market but the increasingly supranational reorganization of the firm’, 14 what are the 
prospects for aviation workers and trade unionism at LFAs such as Ryanair or indeed the 
legacy carriers that are now integrated into global airline alliances? Asked differently, when 
capital reorganizes labor on a transnational scale, how can workers reorganize themselves? 
These questions put the firm and its workforce, rather than the market, at the heart of our 
analysis, but not as decoupled or autonomous actors as firms and workers not only exist 
within different social institutions, they are constituted of competing social relations. 15 
Transnational firms, including airlines, are still dependent on the nation state  for their licenses 
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to operate and to protect their property rights, and even ‘the most flighty of capital must come 
to ground at some point’, 16  quite literally in the case of airlines, creating temporal and 
physical ‘spaces of opportunity’ for organization and action on the part of workers and trade 
unions. In other words, or more precisely the words of labor geography, ‘Workers, too, are 
active geographical agents whose activities can shape economic landscapes’.17 
 In what follows we draw primarily on data from two recent projects with the ETF, 
funded by the European Commission under the auspices of the European Sector Social 
Dialogue Committee for Civil Aviation, 18  as well as data collected for the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) in the aftermath of the most recent crises to hit the sector19 and 
other research dating back over the previous two decades. 20  In the following section we 
review the changing terrain of Europe’s single aviation market (SEAM), the business 
strategies developed by LFAs within this open market, and the turbulence this created for 
legacy airlines as they restructure their route networks, flight operations, business activities 
and industrial relations.  
To understand the strategic choices available to trade unions and their members in the 
SEAM, in a subsequent section we draw on the typology developed by Erne that sets out four 
possible orientations that actors may take in relation to the European integration process: 
Euro-democratization, Euro-technocratization, democratic renationalization and technocratic 
renationalization. 21  While greater or lesser emphasis is placed on different strategies at 
different times or in response to different actors, they are not mutually exclusive. It is often 
remarked, for example, that workers’ voice in the technocratic decision-making process (the 
force of their argument) is only heard when backed by members’ democratic participation in 
union activities, including various forms of collective action (the argument of force). 
Historically, at the national and company levels, aviation unions have exploited their 
structural power in the labor process (their strategic location in a high risk, tightly integrated 
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and interdependent system of flight operations) through robust forms of associational power 
(collective organization and representation). This has yet to be translated to the European 
stage. To be sure, the ETF is a recognized ‘social partner’ for civil aviation and is closely 
involved in many aspects of European aviation policy. However, without the ability to 
mobilize aviation workers across the EU to engage in new disruptive repertoires of collective 
action the ‘default’ position becomes one of ‘bureaucratic international centralism’, 22 
characterized by routine functions, modest aims, and the ‘lowest common denominator’ in 
terms of aviation policy and social protection. As Ryanair is now the ‘lowest common 
denominator’ in the SEAM, we pay particular attention to this modern-day ‘sky pirate’. 
 
Exploiting Cracks in the SEAM 
How markets develop spatially shapes how they develop socially (and vice versa). 23 Spatially 
uneven development means that some workers, in some places, at certain time s, will find 
themselves in a more privileged position than others, often as a result of their material 
interests coinciding (to a greater rather than a lesser extent) with those of capital. 24 Under the 
pre-SEAM system of bilateral air service agreements (BASAs) between nation states, the 
designated airports in the relevant BASA defined the scope of the market, both geographically 
and economically. With typically just two airlines on every route – the respective national 
flag carriers – a system of ‘bilateral monopoly’, with price- fixing between airlines and ‘rent 
sharing’ between capital and labor, prevailed. Hardly surprising, then, that organized labor 
should identify so closely with ‘their’ national airline and this particular spatial fix. In an open 
SEAM, in contrast, the business strategies of new entrant LFAs, and even those of threatened 
legacy airlines, can drive a ‘slow descent to the lowest common denominator’ 25 via ‘regime 
shopping’ and ‘social dumping’. 
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 Unlike US domestic deregulation in 1978, the SEAM was created over an extended 
period with three liberalization packages (December 1987, July 1990 and July 1992) that did 
not take full effect until 1997 with cabotage rights (i.e. the freedom to operate commercial 
services directly between two points in a foreign state). The first years of the SEAM brought 
little change, certainly in terms of pricing, but this was simply the (legacy) calm before the 
(LFA) storm. In 1992, Michael O’Leary, then Deputy CEO of Ryanair, visited Dallas to study 
Southwest Airlines’ low cost model, which subsequently shaped the transformation of 
Ryanair from a ‘full service’ into a ‘no frills’ airline. In 1995, easyJet offered its first flights 
from Luton (near London) to Scotland (Edinburgh and Glasgow) with two leased aircraft 
contracted to British World Airlines to fly and maintain. From these inauspicious beginnings, 
LFAs grew steadily but their market share by the turn of the millennium was still only 5 per 
cent of the European market. Thereafter, however, the ir growth has been exponential. In 
several Member States (e.g. Ireland, Italy, Poland, Spain and the UK) LFAs now hold a 
majority share of the short-haul market. 
Behind every competitive challenge in a capitalist economy is an innovative enterprise 
with superior organizational capabilities. 26  The innovative organization either produces 
(delivers) a superior product (service) at a competitive cost (i.e. product or service innovation) 
or a saleable product/service at a lower cost (i.e. process innovation). 27 Market leaders often 
achieve both product (service) and process innovation. LFAs are evidently highly innovative 
enterprises, having reduced costs significantly and redefined the very experience of flying, 
epitomized by Ryanair’s business strategy that treats its passengers as ‘self- loading cargo’28 
and its aircraft as ‘just a bus with wings’.29 The most significant cost savings secured by 
LFAs include: 
 flying a single aircraft type and a much younger (fuel efficient) fleet, which minimizes 
training and maintenance costs and maximizes the flexibility of staff rostering 
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 using secondary and less congested airports, which minimizes landing charges a nd 
aircraft turnaround time 
 maximizing the number of seats on-board the aircraft (e.g. reducing leg space, 
removing hot galleys, and providing only one class of seating)  
 ‘commodifying’ the product by eliminating any ‘extras’ (e.g. complimentary in- flight 
food and drink) and offering the customer the option to pay separately (additionally) 
for an allocated seat, checked-in baggage, in-flight food and drinks, etc.  
 direct selling, now almost exclusively via the internet rather than via travel agencies 
who charge commission 
 point-to-point services and one-way (single class) fares (i.e. no interlining), and 
 operating from a multitude of bases as the airline expands (spatially) such that staff 
can return to their ‘home base’ after every shift (i.e. no costly overnight stop-overs in 
a foreign country). 
On short-haul (point-to-point) routes, LFAs enjoy a cost advantage over legacy 
airlines anywhere between 25-50 per cent. Ryanair’s cost advantage is closer to 60 per cent,30 
with costs per employee less than €50,000 (in 2011-12) compared to well over €106,000 at 
Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), Europe’s highest cost legacy airline. 31  In fact, the most 
significant contribution to Ryanair’s low cost base comes from high labor productivity32 and 
low unit labor costs (labor productivity x labor costs), with low(er) wages than its rivals and 
an intensive working schedule concentrated over a 9-month (summer peak) period when the 
majority of (temporary) staff work the maximum hours allowed under the European flight and 
duty time limitations (FTL). For example, most cabin crew (over 60 per cent) are employed 
on a 2-year contract with one of two agencies – CrewLink and WorkForce International – and 
then sub-contracted to Ryanair. Their contract stipulates 3 months unpaid leave (compulsory 
furlough) in every 12-month period between the months of November and March when 
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passenger numbers are much lower. This means 900 hours of flying – the maximum allowed 
under European FTL – over a 9-month period. A similar scenario applies for flight crew, with 
an even more complex web of contractual relationships between Ryanair, the principal agency 
(Brookfield International, a UK registered company based in Gibraltar) and an ‘approved list’ 
of accountancy firms who facilitate the ‘self-employment’ of flight crew. Contracts with 
Brookfield state that ‘the services of the pilot are provided on an as required and/or casual 
basis’, but ‘there is no obligation upon Brookfield to locate or offer work’ (i.e. a zero hours 
contract). The work they are offered invariably exhausts the hours allowed by European FTL 
over the busy summer months.  
Flight and cabin crew can be assigned to any of Ryanair’s bases across Europe, at no 
extra cost to the company. Pilots, for example, must cover their own travel and 
accommodation costs when flying ‘out of base’, and then reclaim these costs against their 
(self-employment) earnings. For cabin crew, Clause 6 (Location) of the CrewLink contract 
states that they may be required to work ‘at such other place or places as the Company 
reasonably requires for proper fulfillment of your duties and responsibilities under this 
Agreement … This would include, for the avoidance of doubt, transfer to any of the Client’s 
European bases without compensation’ (emphasis added). Wherever they are based, however, 
their ‘place of work’ (i.e. the aircraft) is Ireland, which is made explicit in the employee’s 
contact with the relevant agency.33 A further twist to this particular spatial-juridical fix is that 
while crew are employed on Irish contracts, their pay is determined locally through a system 
of (company-managed) Employee Representative Committees (ERCs) for each category of 
staff in each base34 as there are no recognized trade unions in Ryanair. All other operational 
activities, such as check- in, ground handling, fuelling, maintenance, etc., are subcontracted to 
independent third parties, which is a particularly effective way for the employer to cut costs, 
shed responsibility, increase flexibility and disempower the workforce. 35 Thus, when Ireland 
 
 
9 
(the aircraft) does ‘come to ground’ it invariably lands in a union-free zone (i.e. a secondary 
airport where airlines, service providers and the local state are keen to keep costs as low as 
possible, especially labor costs). In effect, these airports can be likened to Export Processing 
Zones where worker and trade union rights are more explicitly restricted. 
When LFAs first entered the European market the response of national (flag) airlines 
was essentially ‘studied neglect’ because the newcomers rarely competed head on with legacy 
airlines (i.e. flights to/from the same airports). Experimentation followed as legacy airlines 
introduced their own LFAs, with BA creating Go, KLM introducing Buzz, and SAS operating 
Snowflake. In several cases, however, these new start-ups took traffic from the legacy’s own 
short-haul network, rather than new entrants such as Ryanair and easyJet, and they were soon 
sold to rivals (esayJet bought Go and Ryanair bought Buzz) or disbanded (Snowflake).  
The primary focus of the legacy airlines has been to defend, and extend, their long 
haul services, which typically account for around 40 per cent of revenue but as much as 90 
per cent of operating profit. Legacy restructuring has involved a number of ‘mergers’, 
including Air France-KLM and BA-Iberia, and ‘takeovers’ (e.g. Lufthansa buying into Swiss, 
Brussels Airlines and Austrian Airlines), but the most significant development has been the 
formation and extension of global alliances.36 This has allowed legacy airlines to ‘retreat’ to 
their ‘home hub(s)’ and offer an ‘anywhere to anywhere’ service via the alliance network. But 
they still need domestic (i.e. European) feed. As a result, some LFAs have been welcomed 
into global alliances in order to add more (short haul) destinations (e.g. oneworld-airberlin) or 
brought into airline groups (e.g. IAG-Vueling).  
The most recent response has been to grow a ‘low cost version’ of the main brand for 
short-haul routes, intended not so much to mimic the LFAs as to address structural problems 
(legacy labor costs) within the legacy airline’s network. Germanwings, for example, is 
Lufthansa’s ‘solution’ for its non-hub services (i.e. all flights except those to/from Frankfurt 
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and Munich) with cabin crew paid 40 per cent less at Germanwings than mainline Lufthansa 
crew and with much slower progression up the pay scale. 37 An alternative approach, more 
open to airlines based in more liberal market economies such as the UK where there are 
cracks in both employment law and the associational power of organized labor, involves 
creating a new workforce inside the main airline with staff hired on inferior terms and 
conditions of employment. BA has pioneered this approach by creating a third Mixed Fleet 
alongside its Euro and Worldwide Fleets. However, unlike the spatial fix developed by 
Lufthansa (physically separating Germanwings from the ‘home hubs’), the British Airways 
Mixed Fleet (BAMF) is based at London-Heathrow and BAMF staff are rostered not only for 
short haul (European) routes but also long haul (inter-continental) routes.  
The on-going restructuring of legacy airlines is a reflection of their inability to close 
the cost gap on LFAs, especially labor costs,38 and the competitive challenges they continue 
to face in both their short-haul and most recently their long-haul markets. As LFAs reach 
‘saturation point’ in the new markets they have developed using secondary airports, their 
attention has recently turned to primary airports that have traditionally been dominated by 
legacy airlines.39 In many areas of their business, LFAs are finding it increasingly difficult to 
find further cost savings, with many now seeking to ‘grow revenue’ (e.g. targeting business 
class passengers) or further extend the geographical reach of their route network using the 
new generation of more fuel-efficient aircraft.  easyJet, for example, already offers flights to 
Egypt, Iceland, Israel, Jordon, Morocco and Turkey, and recently added Moscow to its 
destinations. It is likely that LFAs will extend their operations to 4-7 hour routes where they 
can retain many of the cost advantages of their original business model, but beyond that 
time/distance it seems more innovative strategies are needed, opening further cracks in the 
SEAM. 
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Norwegian Air Shuttle (NAS) is one of Europe’s largest LFAs, flying around 18 
million passengers per annum and now operating from eleven bases across Scandinavia and 
the rest of Europe, as well as Bangkok. The latter is used as a base for flights between Asia 
and Europe and then onwards to the USA, with aircrew hired via agencies in Singapore and 
Thailand. To completely break all ties between labor, location and license, NAS has 
established a subsidiary, Norwegian Air International (NAI), with an Irish Air Operator’s 
Certificate (AOC), even though the company has no plans to operate out of Ireland. Irish 
registration is simply a ‘convenient flag’ as NAS shifts the sovereign regulatory regime under 
which social relations take place, enabling NAI to escape from national (Nordic) class 
compromises and exploit the EU-US open skies agreement. This agreement, concluded in two 
phases (2008 and 2010) and signed by Norway in 2011, allows European carriers to fly from 
any EU city to any city in the USA. With the entry of a LFA into this market, the challenge 
for organized labor on both sides of the Atlantic is clear: 
 
NAS is using the unique nature of EU aviation laws to effectively shop around for the 
labor laws and regulations that best suit its bottom line. It’s using a ‘Flag of 
Convenience’ strategy at the expense of decent labor standards. In addition to 
subjecting its own workforce to substandard wages and conditions, the NAS model 
threatens the U.S. aviation workforce ... undercutting US carriers and their employees 
that serve [routes from London to New York City, Fort Lauderdale, Los Angeles, 
Oakland and Orlando] by as much as 50 percent.40 
 
Papering Over the Cracks – Organized Labor and the SEAM 
When capitalists are restricted to in situ strategies that involve working within national 
domestic class compromises, the strength and interests of trade unions and other actors limit 
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the possibilities for business innovation and extreme exploitation. 41 For example, when Iberia 
recently established its own low cost subsidiary, an arbitration agreement that settled a series 
of disputes involving the pilots’ union limited the expansion of Iberia Express under the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement. When NAS recently sought to separate its bases in 
Norway and Denmark, which have been part of the same collective agreement since 2008, 
and transfer the Danish workforce to an employment agency (Proffice) with inferior terms 
and conditions, the airline experienced its first ever strike in Norway (a ‘one-man’ strike by 
René-Charles Gustavsen, the workers’ member on the NAS board, for a period of 12 days). 
The dispute in Norway, combined with a postponement of a legal work conflict in Denmark 
by the mediator, which meant that a strike was never more than 4 to 19 days away, forced the 
company to agree common terms and conditions and stall the outsourcing of cabin crew in 
Denmark.  
 In the case of Ryanair, however, when the airline moved from a ‘home hub’ (Dublin) 
to a multi-base strategy across the SEAM, with aviation unions (quite literally) ‘missing the 
flight’, national trade union strategies have faltered. This is not to gainsay the potential of 
national trade union strategies, as witnessed by the organization of easyJet following the 
introduction of a statutory union recognition procedure in the UK (the Employment Relations 
Act, 1999), which first pilots and then cabin crew were able to use to secure collective 
bargaining rights. But national employment laws and domestic class compromises appear 
increasingly fragile as political parties across Europe move to the right and transnational firms 
position their operations in the interstices of prevailing regulative, normative and socio-spatial 
systems.42 It is much harder for unions to organize these spaces when they are simply ‘spaces 
of engagement’ for workers and not ‘places of dependence’. As Herod notes, ‘Having an 
island of stability in which to stand in a sea of global change may provide the necessary 
support and traditions upon which workers can draw to defend their interests’.43 But when 
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workers are employed in a foreign land, on short-term contracts, spending most of their 
working time ‘in the air’, there is very little stability in their lives. 
The (in)effectiveness of union strategies on the development of the European polity 
can be considered along two dimensions – the decision-making level and decision-making 
process – to create the typology depicted in Figure 1. 44  Following Erne’s approach, the 
typology is used to provide a parsimonious framework to distinguish various strategies based 
on their effect on EU developments, recognizing that different actors are likely to adopt 
different strategies in different situations and in response to the (counter) strategies of 
different actors. 45  Thus, the strategy of organized labor will differ towards LFAs, legacy 
airlines, national and international regulatory authorities, the European Commission, 
European Parliament, Council of Ministers, etc. Moreover, while the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of Figure 1 are ‘divided’ between national/EU and technocratic/democratic, in 
practice both decision-making levels and processes are interconnected. 
*** FIGURE 1 HERE *** 
 Where (legacy) airlines are still reliant on a ‘home hub’, union officials have been 
drawn into protracted and often difficult negotiations with airline management to cut costs, 
increase flexibility (e.g. roster changes) and thereby remain competitive in a n open SEAM. 
For example, unions at SAS recently accepted a major restructuring program (4XNG) that 
aims to reduce costs by 15 per cent between 2012 and 2015, including cuts to staff pay and 
benefits, driven in large part by competition from NAS and other LFAs. This form of 
technocratic renationalization is not so much a social-democratic compromise between capital 
and labor as a monistic alliance to boost the national flag airline’s competitiveness and 
thereby protect jobs. In contrast, if an airline’s bus iness strategy is dependent on a new 
spatial- juridical fix in defiance of physical geography, the favored counter-strategy might be 
to reassert the jurisdiction of the nation state and use national institutions to (re)establish 
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workers’ and trade union rights. This is the defining characteristic of democratic 
renationalization and has proved to be the primary countermovement against Ryanair and 
other LFAs. However, when trans-national organizations deploy their considerable internal 
resources in pursuit of institutional deflection in order to neutralize threats in their external 
environment, any progress for organized labor can be slow and ultimately elusive, certainly 
without engagement in other processes and decision-making levels. 
Attempts to organize Europe’s lowest cost carrier have been led by pilot associations 
in Ireland (IAPLA) and the UK (BALPA). The latter’s involvement is a result of Ryanair’s 
early market development based on flights between Ireland and the UK and the fact that pilots 
based in the UK were initially employed on UK contacts with the airline (as opposed to Irish 
contracts with an agency, which is now the dominant form of employment). An attempt by 
BALPA to use the Employment Relations Act (1999) to secure recognition at Stansted (an 
airport north of London) in 2001 was thwarted when Ryanair ‘flooded the base’ with trainee 
pilots in order to increase the size of the bargaining unit and dilute the union’s potential vote 
in favor of collective bargaining below the 50 per cent needed under the recognition 
procedure.46 A second campaign to secure recognition in 2009 was abandoned in the face of 
an aggressive anti-union campaign before even going to a vote. Thereafter, organizing in the 
UK effectively stalled, while a similar approach in Ireland, in a less favorable domestic socio-
legal environment, ran up against even more aggressive anti-union tactics and led to a shift 
from the democratic to the technocratic, and from the national to the transnational. 
In seeking to hold transnational actors to account in a national setting as part of a 
democratic process to prevent the market economy becoming a market society, organized 
labor invariably falls back on (national) market-correcting (social) policies and institutions to 
combat (European) market-making (economic) policies. In relation to Ryanair, Irish unions 
have taken action in relation to both individual and collective employment rights. With an 
 
 
15 
ever-increasing number of pilots on agency contracts – between 2010 and 2011 the proportion 
increased from 56 per cent to over 70 per cent – unions challenged the ‘self-employment’ 
status of flight crew contracted to Brookfield and flying for Ryanair. Under Irish law, a self-
employed person is someone who, inter alia, controls their hours of work in fulfilling the job 
obligations, costs and agrees a price for the job, and is free to provide the same service to 
more than one person or business at the same time. Brookfield contracts do not satisfy these 
criteria as rosters and rates of pay are unilaterally determined by Ryanair and the Brookfield 
contract bonds the pilot to fly exclusively for Ryanair. IALPA therefore sought clarification 
of the ‘self-employment’ status of pilots with the Irish Revenue Commissioners and the 
Minister for Finance in 2008. In response, Ryanair followed its usual tactic of threatening 
legal action against IALPA officials 47  – in this instance for disclosing ‘confidential 
information’ (i.e. contracts of employment) to third parties – but otherwise avoided 
institutional engagement by requiring all contract pilots to set up a Limited Company (an 
‘agency employment service provider’) in any of one of the EU Member States (or 
Switzerland) to supply pilot services, via Brookfield, to Ryanair.48 
While deflecting some Irish institutions (the Revenue Commissioners), Ryanair is still 
reliant on others (e.g. the Irish Aviation Authority and Irish employment laws and industrial 
relations). The ‘place of work’ for aircrew remains an Irish registered aircraft and most 
aircrew continue to pay income tax and social insurance contributions in Ireland, even if they 
are based in a different Member State. For obvious reasons, the State where aircrew resides 
would prefer taxes to be paid in their country – i.e. the country of residence of the worker 
rather than the country of registration of the aircraft – because residents are likely to use local 
(rather than Irish) social services. As a result, two national countermeasures have been 
implemented. First, several Member States, often at the behest of national aviation unions, 
have passed new laws to compel airlines with bases in their country to comply with national 
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labor and social laws (e.g. French decree law of 2006)49 or to insist that companies (such as a 
pilot’s limited company) pay taxes in the country where they make a profit (e.g. new business 
laws in Italy). LFAs have challenged these laws and when they lose, as they did in the Conseil 
d’Etat in 2007 in France, they can either transfer staff onto country of residence contracts 
(e.g. easyJet has switched from exclusively UK to ‘country of base’ contracts) or transfer the 
base (e.g. Ryanair closed its base in Marseille in 2010 and now serves the French market from 
bases outside France with aircrew on Irish contracts). 50 Secondly, tax authorities have sought 
‘unpaid taxes’ (and fines) from Ryanair staff who reclaimed taxes from the Irish tax 
authorities (as they are entitled to do if living outside Ireland) but then failed to pay taxes in 
the country of residence. The latter places unions in a somewhat invidious position, as they 
cannot condone tax avoidance but understand the financial pressures fac ing newly qualified 
pilots and cabin crew.51 
With respect to individual employment rights, therefore, the disquiet expressed 
initially in Ireland has crossed borders and shifted from the (democratic) concerns of trade 
unions to the (technocratic) countermeasures of the nation state. The most recent example of 
this process concerned the (unfair) dismissal of two Italian cabin crew, working out of 
Ryanair’s base at Rygge Airport, Moss (south of Oslo). Parat, the Norwegian aviation union, 
passed copies of cabin crew contracts to politicians who debated Ryanair’s terms and 
conditions in the Norwegian Parliament. During the debate, various conditions were likened 
to ‘slave contracts’ (e.g. employees paying for their own training, uniforms and ID cards, with 
repayment deducted from monthly paychecks; ‘stand-by’ shifts with no compensation when 
not called into work; compulsory unpaid leave during non-peak periods; participation in any 
strike or demonstration classified as grounds for immediate dismissal; and an ‘administration 
fee’ of €200 if the employee resigned prior to completing 15 months service). Ryanair’s CEO 
flew into Norway to rebuke the claims of ‘slave contracts’ (on the grounds that workers can 
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always quit and the company has 5,000 people on waiting lists for jobs) and to explain the 
airline’s spatial-judicial fix (i.e. why Ryanair staff based in Norway do not pay taxes in 
Norway). In the words of the CEO: ‘Ryanair must comply with Irish law because we’re an 
Irish airline operating Irish-regulated aircraft, our employees are employed under Irish 
contracts and we must respect Irish law … if the Norwegians have trouble with that they 
should take it up with the European Union or the Irish government.’ 52 The Norwegians did 
‘have trouble’ with this interpretation – in the words of Marit Arnstad, the Transport Minister, 
‘As long as the company has a base with aircraft stationed in Norway and the employees on 
board the aircraft reside in Norway longer than just the required resting periods between 
flights, they are covered by Norwegian labour laws’.53 After several (failed) legal challenges 
by Ryanair the Italian cabin crew won the right for their unfair dismissal claim to be heard in 
Norway rather than Ireland. 
Action to promote and protect workers’ collective rights has followed a similar 
pattern, once again inspired initially by Irish pilots. When Ryanair switched from Boeing 737-
200s to B737-800s in 2004, the airline wrote to all pilots who were to be retrained informing 
them that the company would not refund the €15,000 training costs: ‘if Ryanair be compelled 
to engage in collective bargaining with any pilot association or trade union within 5 years of 
commencement of your conversion training’. Several pilots who were unwilling to sign the 
contract found themselves in the High Court on a charge of bullying after encouraging other 
pilots (via a union website) not to sign the contract. The judge, however, ruled that Ryanair 
was the bully, describing the actions of management as being designed ‘to terrify’, quoting 
Shakespeare for good measure in his judgment: ‘Oh, it is excellent to have a giant’s strength; 
but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant’.54  
More importantly, several pilots expressed their dissatisfaction with the company’s 
Employee Representative Committee (ERC), a non-union vehicle for the local determination 
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of pay and conditions in each base. The Dublin representatives withdrew from the ERC in 
August 2004 and applied to the Labour Court with a request for IALPA to negotiate on their 
behalf. Under Irish law, trade unions have no right to be recognized for collective bargaining 
purposes by an employer – this ‘right’ is typically secured through the use, or threat of 
collective action – while the employer can establish an ‘excepted body’ for the purposes of 
collective bargaining, defined in the Trade Unions Acts of 1941 (s.6(3)(h)) and 1942 (s.2) as: 
‘a body all the members of which are employed by the same employer and which carries on 
negotiations for the fixing of wages or other conditions of employment o f its own members 
(but no other employees)’. As an increasing number of employers did not engage in collective 
bargaining in Ireland, especially in the ‘union free zones’ that proliferated during the years of 
the ‘Celtic Tiger’, the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Acts 2001-2004 gave workers 
(represented by a trade union) recourse to the Irish Labour Court, which IALPA used to 
establish that Ryanair’s ERC was not an ‘excepted body’. When Ryanair appealed, however, 
the Supreme Court not only reversed the decision but declared that: ‘as a matter of law 
Ryanair is perfectly entitled not to deal with trade unions nor can a law be passed compelling 
it to do so’ (emphasis added). As a result, with the commission of the state, and crew 
‘conscripted’ on Irish contracts, the ‘sky pirate’ is free to plunder the European short-haul 
market. 
Unable to secure the democratic rights of Ryanair workers in Ireland, IALPA turned to 
international trade union federations and the technocratic process of international law. As a 
branch of the Irish Municipal Public and Civil Trade Union (IMPACT), IALPA was able to 
enlist the support of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) as well as the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
to submit a complaint against the Government of Ireland to the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) in Geneva. Ireland has ratified ILO Convention No.87 (Freedom of 
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Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948) and Convent ion No.98 (Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining, 1949) and the unions alleged: (i) acts of anti-union 
discrimination, (ii) the refusal of Ryanair to engage in good faith bargaining, and (iii) the 
failure of Ireland’s labor legislation to provide adequate protection against acts of anti-union 
discrimination and promote collective bargaining. Although the report of the ILO’s Freedom 
of Association Committee 55  proved to be an important factor in the latest proposal (May 
2014) by the Irish Government to reform the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001, the 
length of this process (2004 to 2014) has convinced trade unions that a renationalization 
strategy can never be an ‘end game’ in an open aviation market where regime competition 
and social dumping is increasingly prevalent. Trade unions clearly need to ‘shift scale’ and 
build a transnational movement, with sustained work at an international level and not simply 
‘the reproduction, at a different level, of the claims, targets, and constituencies of the sites 
where contention begins’, but ‘new alliances, new targets, and changes in the foci of claims 
and perhaps even new identities’.56 However, attempts by European aviation unions to shift 
scale, to date, have met with only limited success. 
 ‘Insiders’ with access to EU decision-makers tend to favor a Euro-technocratization 
strategy 57  and as a recognized social partner the ETF is well versed in the ‘politics of 
expertise’ favored by the European Commission. Indeed, the ETF has relied historically on 
the ‘force of argument’ rather than the ‘argument of force’. The main aims of the ‘Brussels 
Committee’, as the ETF was formerly known,58 were to ‘represent the interests of transport 
workers’ unions to the institutions of the European Community’, recognizing that ‘the 
coordination of international solidarity … is primarily a matter for the ITF’. 59 All too often, 
however, and certainly during the recent tenure of Siim Kallas as Transport Commissioner 
(2010-14), the Commission (DG Move) has been unwilling to accept the force of labor’s 
arguments, which are rarely seen as compatible with the EU’s free-market objectives. Thus, 
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the primary limits of Euro-technocratization lie not in a lack of access to EU institutions but 
the ‘insulation’ of EU decision-makers ‘from the dysfunctional aspirations of citizens by 
other means – namely, through a restriction of the realm of legitimate claims that social actors 
can make’. 60  When legitimate claims fail, trade unions need to develop less conventional 
repertories of collective action (the transnational argument of force). 
More often, however, it seems that when European trade union federations become 
embroiled in the comitology of the EU 61  – which is probably as far removed from the 
capacities and inclinations of local union organizations and their members as it is possible to 
be – they are enveloped in an ‘elite embrace’ accompanied by the suppression of both 
political alternatives and mobilization capacity. 62 To be sure, deliberative institutions at the 
supranational (EU) level can provide trade unions with strategic capacities they would not 
otherwise enjoy, but the democratic involvement of rank-and-file union members is often 
sacrificed and decision-making processes and agreements that are struck at this level are not 
always in the best (immediate) interests of aviation workers. The ETF’s campaign to redefine 
the ‘home base’ of aircrew, in conjunction with the European Cockpit Association (ECA), 63 is 
a case in point. 
Under Article 13 of European Community regulation 883/2004, social security was 
determined to arise in either (i) the country in which the individual is habitually resident (i.e. 
where personal and economic ties are strongest, based on at least 25 per cent of an 
individual’s income earned in the Member State o f residence), or (ii) the country in which the 
individual’s employer has its registered office or place of business (e.g. Ryanair aircraft 
registered in Ireland) and where individuals do not work substantially in the country in which 
they habitually reside (e.g. aircrew who ‘work in the skies’ over Europe). Trade union action 
(a Euro-technocratic strategy) led to an amendment to the regulations (465/2012/EC), agreed 
by a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers (only Ireland abstained) and approved by 
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the European Parliament. The amendment introduced a new concept of the ‘home base’, 
which can be considered as a (counter) spatial-juridical fix for aviation labor, defined as the 
place where the employee normally starts or ends his or her periods of duty and where, under 
normal conditions, the operator is not responsible for the accommodation of the aircrew in 
question. As a result, an Estonian worker with Ryanair based in Italy, on an Irish contract, 
will now be subject to Italian social security legislation and no longer to Irish legislation (i.e. 
contributions paid in Italy and not Ireland). 64  For the ETF, this represents an important 
countermeasure against social dumping, but for the individual worker it can mean a 
substantial increase in social security contributions and a reduction in net pay. Union 
organizers in Italy and several other EU Member States have already dealt with complaints 
from potential and current members about the increase in social taxes (i.e. reduction in their 
net pay), highlighting the need for much closer articulation between local, national and 
international levels of union organization. 
The committee procedure (comitology) of the EU can also distance aviation unions 
from their European federation, as recent negotiations over new European flight time 
limitations (FTL) serve to demonstrate. Under pressure of time and the demands of other 
stakeholders, the ETF agreed to changes that several aviation unions fear will result in legacy 
airlines rostering staff to work right up to the maximum duty times in an attempt to match the 
labor productivity of LFAs. Many ETF affiliates objected to the lack of communication 
during the process of negotiations or any vote on the final draft, and as a result several unions 
have now left the ETF to form a rival European federation for cabin crew. Fragmentation is a 
particularly unwelcome development at a time when unions are trying to build stronger 
international solidarity, mobilize workers to participate in new forms of collective 
organization and action, and politicize EU decision-making in a transnational public sphere. 
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Transnational campaigns to encourage involvement beyond the immediate workforce 
(e.g. claims of unfair competition and state aid at secondary airports, the impact of LFAs on 
the environment, poor customer service and the like) have highlighted concerns but achieved 
very little in terms of union organization (e.g. the ITF’s ‘Ryan-be-fair’ campaign). 65  In 
contrast, unlike traditional union campaigns or forms of organization, the Ryanair Pilots 
Group (RPG) represents a new Euro-democratization strategy that makes use of ‘distributed 
technologies’ to create new structures and provide an outlet for suppressed voices. 
Established in October 2012 with the support of the ECA and pilot associations in several EU 
Member States, most notably IAPLA, the RPG started life as a ‘virtual international union’ to 
demand ‘professional treatment for professional pilots’. The RPG has been very careful to 
verify that all its members work for Ryanair as a previous organization – the Ryanair 
European Pilots’ Group – was infiltrated and disrupted by management. The RPG decided to 
elect an Interim Council (June 2013) staffed by union officials co-opted from other European 
pilot associations, with one exception (Captain John Goss who has flown with Ryanair for 26 
years) in order to avoid any possibility of victimization and dismissal until formal recognition 
has been secured.66 Members of the Council have visited almost every Ryanair base across 
Europe to identify the main concerns of contract pilots in particular and build support for the 
RPG. 
Ryanair has indicated that it will only consider recognition if and when the RPG has a 
majority of pilots in membership, a milestone it in fact reached in the first quarter of 2014, but 
has so far resisted any involvement of the RPG in local negotiations and has even threatened 
pilots with discipline if they wear the RPG lanyard with their ID pass. Despite this 
oppression, the RPG provides a network that connects pilots across Europe and is an 
important outlet for discourses of identity building and solidarity that are needed to create a 
‘we- feeling’ and a sense of belonging to a common polity. Put differently, the RPG creates a 
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bridge across the horizontal spatial divide between workers’ organizations in different 
countries where Ryanair has its bases. It also fords the vertical gaps in the international 
system between local, national and transnational levels of union organization and 
representation. Thus, while the RPG will deal with Ryanair on any pan-European issues, all 
pilots are also encouraged to join their local ‘home base’ pilots’ association and almost two-
thirds now hold ‘dual membership’. As Erne notes, ‘if there is to be a Europeanization of 
organized labor, it must take place not only in the EU-level structures but also within the 
respective national-, local-, and firm- level union organizations’.67 The extension of the low 
cost model to long-haul (inter-continental) routes demands a further level of union 
organization. 
The potential for ‘flags of convenience’ (FoC) on trans-Atlantic routes was the major 
concern of aviation unions when they persuaded US and EU officials to hold a forum on 
‘Liberalisation and Labour’ in 2008, prior to the conc lusion of the second stage of the US-EU 
open skies agreement.68 These concerns led to the inclusion of Article 17 in the US-EU Air 
Transport Agreement, which states that: ‘the opportunities created by the Agreement are not 
intended to undermine labour standards or labour-related rights and principles contained in 
the Parties’ respective laws’. Nonetheless, aviation unions once again found themselves on 
the defensive as Norwegian Long Haul, a subsidiary of NAS, began flights from Oslo to New 
York and Bangkok in 2012 using two Irish-registered aircraft under a Norwegian AOC with 
contract pilots (Global Crew Asia, based in Singapore) and agency cabin crew (Adecco, based 
in Thailand), an interim arrangement permitted for a 12-month period under Norwegian 
regulations. 69  The subsequent creation of NAI, a new (FoC) airline with a ‘crew of 
convenience’, was therefore entirely predictable but the trade union response has been 
predominantly national and fragmented. 
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Initially, Parat (the Norwegian aviation union) raised its concerns with the Norwegian 
Ministry of Transport and Communications. The union questioned whether Asian crews 
would be allowed to work on flights within the EU as well as inter-continental routes and 
whether Norwegian authorities would still be responsible for background checks of aircrew. 
The Ministry subsequently wrote to the European Commission (DG Move) to highlight the 
fact that: ‘Discrepancies between national legislation within the EU/EEA may result in a non-
level playing field, both on operations within the EU/EEA and on operations between 
EU/EEA and third countries’.70 For example, crew working for an EU/EEA air carrier may 
‘check in’ on day one at a formal ‘home base’ in a third country (typically South East Asia or 
the Middle East), after which they travel to Europe and work on flights between EU/EEA 
countries for ten days, returning to the ‘home base’ and ‘checking out’ on day twelve. If they 
are accommodated by the airline while in Europe and receive compensation for food expenses 
then the airline will circumvent the amendments to the new ‘home base’ rule (labor’s spatial 
counter- fix). In effect, therefore, the NAS strategy not only opens the inter-continental market 
to low cost competition from an Asian ‘crew of convenience’ but also the intra-European 
market, potentially undercutting even Ryanair. However, despite the threat posed to labor on 
both sides of the Atlantic there was very little concerted opposition to NAI’s application for 
an Irish AOC, certainly not at a supranational (EU) level. Nor was there any coordinated 
trans-Atlantic action, rather a largely separate and sequential campaign to prevent NAI 
obtaining a Foreign Air Carrier permit in the USA. While the Transport Trades Department 
(AFL-CIO) persuaded the House of Representatives to defer a decision on NAI’s application, 
this hardly constitutes the arrest of a ‘sky pirate’ or evidence of a ‘scale shift’ that denotes 
international democratization. 
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Conclusion 
In a SEAM where cracks have appeared as a result of LFAs innovative business strategies 
that exploit non-territorial sovereignty in order to reconfigure employment relationships and 
industrial relations, aviation unions have continued to focus predominantly on their national 
place rather than new European spaces opened up by the SEAM. They tend to view 
transnational activity, by and large, through the lens of challenges facing their national (flag) 
airline, neglecting to organize the many contract and temporary workers, domestic and 
foreign, who work for the LFAs. When they do turn their attention to the LFAs, they often 
find that national level strategies, whether democratic or technocratic, are easily deflected by 
airlines that have created new European spatial-juridical fixes to exert control over labor and 
extract surplus value. 
LFAs in general, and the ‘sky pirates’ in particular, are far less embedded in national 
institutions and industrial relations when compared to trans-national corporations in other 
sectors such as manufacturing. To be sure, they still depend on the nation state for an AOC 
and are more than willing to exploit and export weak(er) systems of employment protection, 
social security and industrial relations via the ‘place of work’ (the aircraft). However, whereas 
manufacturing firms exploit labor as a ‘factor of location’ as well as a ‘factor of production’ 
(e.g. drawing on local traditions of work and skills in a particular economic activity), LFAs 
seek to ‘dis-embed’ labor from the country of origin and contractually distance aircrew from 
their ultimate employer. Even the new ‘home base’ – labor’s counter spatial-juridical fix – is 
unlikely to be the worker’s ‘natural home’. This makes union organization all the more 
difficult, certainly in the absence of a supranational strategy (a ‘scale shift’) that combines an 
engagement with EU institutions as well as the involvement of aviation workers in new 
transnational organizations and networks that can develop new repertories of (disruptive) 
collective action. A strategy of institutional access (European technocracy), without direct 
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(democratic) action to back it up, or the force of argument without the argument of force, can 
lead to dependence and division, as the ETF has discovered to its cost. Euro-democratization, 
however, is still underdeveloped, suggesting there is little prospect, at least in the immediate 
future, of arresting the ‘sky pirates’ who plunder European skies and threaten to do the same 
over the Atlantic.  
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